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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 On June 27, 2013, Brandy Kane went to the hospital 
and reported that she may have been the victim of a sexual 
assault.  That night, Officer Shawn Barger of the Coraopolis 
Police Department went to the hospital to interview Kane 
regarding the possible assault.  At that time, Kane says Barger 
told her to bring the clothes she wore during the alleged 
incident to him at the police station. 
 
 The next day, Kane—accompanied by a friend—
brought her clothes to the police station.  While there, 
contrary to department policy, Barger met alone with Kane in 
a back room of the station.  Then, also in violation of 
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department policy, Barger used his personal cell phone to 
photograph intimate areas of Kane’s body. 
 
During this encounter, Barger touched Kane twice.  
First, rather than relying on Kane to do so, Barger pulled 
Kane’s shorts down to photograph a bruise on her right 
buttock.  At this point, Kane says she “felt something touch 
her butt crack which caused her to jump.”1  Second, again 
without asking Kane to do so, Barger pulled Kane’s tank top 
down to expose a bruise on her upper chest. 
 
Kane says that, while photographing her, Barger 
repeatedly asked about her breasts, vagina, and buttocks.  In 
this regard, Barger persistently inquired if Kane sustained 
injuries to her vagina.  Despite Kane’s consistent denials, 
Barger’s relentless questioning led Kane to expose her vagina 
to him. 
 
After photographing Kane, Officer Barger failed to 
document the clothing evidence that Kane provided.  
Moreover, when Kane later reported Barger’s actions, he 
gave inconsistent accounts of his behavior.  Indeed, while 
Barger initially denied photographing Kane at all—let alone 
with his cell phone—he later admitted he lied because he did 
not want his girlfriend to be jealous that he photographed 
Kane. 
 
 Against this background, Kane alleges that Barger 
violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity 
by—in the course of purportedly interviewing her about her 
alleged sexual assault—touching her and using his personal 
                                              
1 App. 173. 
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cell phone to photograph her intimate areas in violation of 
department policy.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Barger, finding that—even if Barger’s 
conduct was unlawful—he was still immune from suit under 
the exacting “clearly established” prong of our qualified 
immunity analysis. 
 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to 
Kane, which supports an inference that Barger acted for 
personal gratification rather than investigative ends, we hold 
that Barger’s conduct shocks the conscience and violated 
Kane’s right to bodily integrity.  We further hold that the 
right at issue was clearly established at the time of Barger’s 
conduct.  Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
A.2 
 
 In the early morning of June 27, 2013, Kane—then 20 
years old—was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, 
underage drinking, resisting arrest, and escape.  After being 
released from jail that day, Kane—who had “blacked out” 
from alcohol consumption—grew concerned that she may 
have been sexually assaulted because she was not wearing 
pants when she was arrested, she had a large amount of 
vaginal discharge, and she could not recall what happened.  
Because of these concerns, Kane went to the hospital that 
                                              
2 Because we are reviewing a claim of qualified immunity, we 
recount the facts in the light most favorable to Kane.  Karns 
v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 520 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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night for both a psychiatric evaluation and a rape kit 
examination.  As part of the rape kit examination, a doctor 
photographed injuries to Kane’s arms, shoulders, knees, and 
legs. 
 
 That evening, Officer Barger—then 40 years old—
went to the hospital to collect the rape kit.  Barger also 
interviewed Kane in the presence her mother and a victim 
advocate.  The parties dispute what occurred next.  While 
Kane maintains that Barger told her to bring the clothes she 
wore during the purported assault to him at the police station 
the following day, Barger contends that Kane came to the 
station to get her cell phone.  In any event, the next day, 
Kane—and her friend, Cayla Combs—went to the Coraopolis 
Police Station with the clothes she wore during the alleged 
incident. 
 
 At the station, Kane and Combs both met separately 
with Barger.  Contrary to department policy, Kane and Barger 
met alone in a back room of the station.  Kane asserts that 
Barger closed the hallway door.  However, while Barger 
admits that he directed Kane to the back room, he says that 
the door to the hallway was open.  During this meeting, in 
further violation of department policy, Barger used his 
personal cell phone to photograph Kane’s intimate areas, 
including her breasts and buttocks.  
 
 At the outset, Barger asked Kane if she had bruising on 
or around her intimate areas.  Kane told Barger that the 
hospital photographed all of her injuries except for a bruise 
on her right buttock.  Barger then asked Kane if he could 
photograph the bruise on her right buttock.  In so doing, 
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Barger said he had a special application on his personal cell 
phone for taking photographs.3  Kane agreed. 
 
 Before Barger photographed Kane’s right buttock, 
Kane pulled down her gym shorts to expose that area.  
Thereafter, without asking Kane to do so, Barger pulled 
Kane’s shorts down further to more fully expose the bruise on 
her right buttock so he could photograph it.4  At this point, 
Kane “felt something touch her butt crack which caused her 
to jump.”5  Barger denies touching Kane’s buttocks and 
maintains that he only moved the tag on the back of Kane’s 
shorts. 
 
 Kane says that Barger repeatedly asked about her 
breasts, vagina, and buttocks while holding his personal cell 
phone and photographing her.  Because Barger kept asking 
about her buttocks, Kane asked if he wanted to photograph 
her other injuries.  Barger answered in the affirmative.  
Altogether, Kane believes Barger photographed her between 
                                              
3 Barger says, and his official report reflects, that the 
department’s digital camera was inoperative.  However, his 
report also failed to mention that he photographed Kane using 
his personal cell phone. 
4 In his deposition, Barger described his attempt as 
“unsuccessful” because the application would “freeze” when 
he “would take a photograph.”  App. 212.  Nevertheless, in a 
request for admission, Barger agreed that he “took 
photographs of Brandy Kane in the Coraopolis Borough 
Police Station.”  App. 252.  In any event, Barger concedes 
that he intended to photograph Kane. 
5 App. 173. 
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four and eight times.  Nevertheless, Kane does not know for 
sure because she did not see any photographs or hear a 
camera “click.”  Barger admits that he attempted to 
photograph Kane between five and seven times. 
 
 During that first round of photographing, Barger twice 
asked Kane if she had injuries to her vagina.  She responded 
in the negative both times.  Barger later told Kane that the 
photographs did not save and asked her if he could retake 
them.  Kane agreed.  Kane contends that, during this second 
round of photographing, Barger again asked her if she had 
injuries to her vagina.  Kane again responded in the negative.  
However, despite her repeated denials, at some point Kane 
exposed her vagina to Barger.  Kane also asserts that Barger 
looked at her vagina.  While Kane is unsure whether Barger 
photographed her vagina, she asserts he made her “feel like 
he did” because “he kept asking about it.”6 
 
 At one point, after Barger asked about a bruise on 
Kane’s chest, he—again without having Kane do so—pulled 
her tank top down to expose her upper chest area.  After 
Barger did so, Kane held her tank top where Barger 
positioned it so he could photograph the bruise on her upper 
chest area.  While Kane’s breasts were not fully exposed, her 
upper chest was.  Kane contends that Barger also had her sit 
on a table so he could photograph her inner thighs.  Barger 
denies this and says that Kane merely stood on the opposite 
side of the desk.  Kane further maintains that Barger 
instructed her to pull her shorts up to her bikini line so he 
could photograph her inner thighs. 
                                              
6 App. 174. 
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 After photographing Kane, Barger said he would 
continue his investigation.  Kane then left the police station.  
Barger later interviewed a number of possible witnesses to 
Kane’s sexual assault.  However, Barger failed to document 
the clothing evidence that Kane brought to him at the station.  
While Barger asserts that Kane’s clothing was given to an 
“evidence officer to take custody of,” he claims he does not 
know what happened to those items.7 
 
 Kane’s mother later reported Barger’s conduct to the 
Allegheny County Police Department.  Then, on July 9, Kane 
met with Allegheny County Detective Michael Kuma to 
discuss the photographs that Barger had taken.  After meeting 
with Kane, Kuma began investigating Barger.  During 
Kuma’s first interview with Barger, Barger denied 
photographing Kane at all in the back room of the station, let 
alone with his personal cell phone.  Nevertheless, during a 
follow-up interview with Kuma, Barger admitted that he 
photographed Kane using his personal cell phone.   
 
 According to Kuma’s official report, Barger explained 
that he lied about photographing Kane because he was 
worried that his girlfriend might become jealous upon 
learning he had done so.  Kuma further reported that Barger 
said he took six or seven photographs of Kane’s upper chest, 
buttocks, inner thighs, and the front and back of her legs.  
Kuma also said that Barger told him he deleted the photos.  
Barger concedes that he lied in his initial meeting with Kuma.  
However, Barger maintains that—while he attempted to 
                                              
7 App. 210. 
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photograph Kane—he did not delete photographs of Kane 
because his phone never saved them in the first place.8  
  
 Ultimately, Barger consented to disciplinary action for 
“serious violations of departmental policy,” including using 
his cell phone—instead of department equipment—to 
photograph Kane, interviewing and photographing a female 
without a fellow officer or witness present, and failing to 
initially provide a full disclosure of the underlying incident.9  
Barger was also removed from the investigation into Kane’s 
alleged sexual assault and suspended for two weeks without 
pay.  
 
B. 
 
 Subsequently, Kane filed this civil rights action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Barger violated her Fourteenth 
Amendment right to bodily integrity during his investigation 
into whether she was the victim of a sexual assault.  Barger 
                                              
8 Kuma later used an extraction device to review 
approximately thirteen thousand photographs on Barger’s 
personal cell phone.  During his review, Kuma could not 
conclusively identify any photographs of Kane.  However, 
Kuma did find a photograph of an unidentifiable woman—
who could have been Kane—whose pants were pulled down 
to expose her buttocks.  While Kuma maintains that the 
device should have recovered any photographs of Kane that 
Barger deleted, he explained that “[i]n [his] experience using 
the [extraction] device, there is no hard and fast rule that it 
downloads everything.”  SA 464.  
9 App. 245. 
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moved for summary judgment on two grounds.  First, he 
argued that his conduct—even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Kane—did not violate Kane’s right to bodily 
integrity.  Second, he asserted that—even if he violated 
Kane’s right to bodily integrity—he was entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment for 
Barger on qualified immunity grounds.  Two aspects of the 
decision below warrant mention here.   
 
 On one hand, the District Court stated that, “although 
it did not involve direct sexual contact, Officer Barger’s 
conduct in the course of his duties, considered as a whole,” 
could be “sufficiently appalling in terms of violating Kane’s 
bodily integrity to be considered conscious-shocking [sic] for 
purposes of the constitutional tort that Kane advances in this 
case.”10  On this point, the District Court observed that 
“[t]here is little question that the record here would amply 
support a finding that the conduct to which Officer Barger has 
admitted was improper and highly inappropriate.”11 
 
 However, the District Court did not ultimately decide 
whether Barger violated Kane’s right to bodily integrity.  
Rather, the District Court found that, even if Barger violated 
Kane’s rights, her claim would still fail under “the exacting 
standard of the ‘clearly established’ prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis.”12  In so holding, the District Court noted 
                                              
10 App. 29. 
11 App. 22. 
12 App. 29. 
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that—in light of the law at the time of Barger’s conduct—it 
could not conclude that “every reasonable police officer in 
Officer Barger’s position would have known that his 
particular conduct in photographing or attempting to 
photograph Kane in what is alleged to be a sexually-
gratifying manner and in violation of [] professional and 
Departmental standards during an investigation into her 
possible sexual assault deprived Kane” of her right to bodily 
integrity.13  This appeal followed.14   
  
II. 
 
 “Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”15  We conduct a two-step inquiry 
to determine whether a government official is entitled to 
qualified immunity.  “First, we ask whether the facts—taken 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—show 
that a government official violated a constitutional right.”16  
“Second, we ask whether that right was clearly established at 
the time of the official’s actions.”17   
                                              
13 App. 31. 
14 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002). 
15 Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). 
16 Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015). 
17 Id. 
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A. 
 
 Kane argues that Barger violated her substantive due 
process right to bodily integrity by touching her and using his 
personal cell phone to photograph her intimate areas in 
violation of department policy while supposedly interviewing 
her about her alleged sexual assault.  To demonstrate that her 
substantive due process rights were violated, Kane must 
establish that “the particular interest at issue is protected by 
the substantive due process clause,” and that “the 
government’s deprivation of that protected interest shocks the 
conscience.”18  We address each element in turn.   
 
 With regard to the first element, we have recognized 
that “[i]ndividuals have a constitutional liberty interest in 
personal bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”19  The Supreme Court 
has also specifically observed that “the ‘liberty’ specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] . . . 
to bodily integrity.”20  With this context, as the District Court 
rightly observed, “Kane had a right to not have her bodily 
integrity violated by a police officer investigating her 
potential sexual assault.”21  
                                              
18 Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008). 
19 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also Black by Black v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 985 
F.2d 707, 709 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a liberty interest in bodily integrity). 
20 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) 
(citation omitted). 
21 App. 31. 
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  Accordingly, we must proceed to the second element 
of our substantive due process inquiry: specifically, whether 
Barger’s conduct shocks the conscience.  While “only the 
most egregious official conduct” can shock the conscience,22 
“[t]he level of culpability required for behavior to shock the 
conscience largely depends on the context in which the action 
takes place.”23  In this regard, we have observed that “[i]n a 
hyperpressurized environment, such as a high-speed police 
chase, intent to harm is required.”24  However, “where 
deliberation is possible and officials have the time to make 
unhurried judgments, deliberate indifference is sufficient.”25  
Here, there is no indication that Barger faced circumstances 
calling for quick decision-making while photographing Kane.  
To the contrary, Barger had time for “actual deliberation.”26  
Accordingly, the standard here is deliberate indifference, 
which requires “a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of 
serious harm.”27 
                                              
22 Chainey, 523 F.3d at 219 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
23 L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 246 (3d 
Cir. 2016); see also Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 847 (1998) (noting that the “measure of what is 
conscience shocking is no calibrated yard stick”).   
24 L.R., 836 F.3d at 246 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
25 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
26 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851. 
27 L.R., 836 F.3d at 246 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
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 Against this background, Barger contends that Kane’s 
substantive due process claim fails because he did not 
“commit[] a serious battery that shocks the conscience.”28  In 
support, Barger relies on out-of-circuit cases in which 
conduct he describes as “well beyond anything alleged 
against [him]” was found to not be conscience-shocking.29  
For example, Barger cites the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Hawkins v. Holloway.30  In Hawkins, male police officers 
alleged that their sheriff violated their substantive due process 
rights by groping them and making lewd comments.31  In 
rejecting the officers’ argument, the Court explained that, 
while the sheriff’s conduct was “perverted,” the officers’ 
“allegations of inappropriate sexual contact on the sheriff’s 
part [] fall into the category of misconduct for which no 
constitutional remedy is available.”32 
 
 Barger also cites two unpublished district court cases 
from the Seventh Circuit, Nagle v. McKernan,33 and Decker 
v. Tinnel.34  In Nagle, the plaintiff alleged that a fire marshal 
violated her right to bodily integrity while inspecting her 
place of employment by cornering her in her office, leaning 
                                              
28 Appellee’s Br. at 16. 
29 Appellee’s Br. at 21. 
30 316 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2003). 
31 Id. at 784–85. 
32 Id. at 785. 
33 No. 07 C 680, 2007 WL 2903179 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007). 
34 No. 2:04-CV-227, 2005 WL 3501705 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 
2005). 
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against her body, and breathing on her while intimately 
pressing his face against the back of her head and neck.35  
The Northern District of Illinois disagreed, concluding that—
while his behavior was “strange and inappropriate”—the fire 
marshal’s conduct did not shock the conscience.36 
 
 Likewise, in Decker, the plaintiff—an 18-year-old 
woman—alleged that a police officer violated her right to 
bodily integrity during a police ride-along by touching her 
breasts and thighs, kissing her, and repeatedly making 
sexually suggestive comments.37  While the Northern District 
of Indiana characterized the officer’s conduct as “improper 
and reprehensible,” it nevertheless held that it “d[id] not rise 
to the level of a constitutional violation” that shocked the 
conscience.38 
 
 We are not persuaded.  As explained, wholly contrary 
to department policy, Barger met with Kane—then 
considered a possible sexual assault victim—alone in the 
back room of the police station.  During that encounter, 
Barger charted a course that, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Kane, violated her right to bodily integrity and 
shocks the conscience.  In the back room, in further violation 
of department policy, Barger photographed intimate areas of 
Kane’s body with his personal cell phone.  In the course of 
taking the photos, Barger personally pulled Kane’s shorts and 
tank top down to expose her right buttock and upper chest, 
                                              
35 Nagle, 2007 WL 2903179 at *1. 
36 Id. at *2. 
37 Decker, 2005 WL 3501705 at *1–2. 
38 Id. at *9. 
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rather than having Kane do so herself.  Moreover, when 
Barger tugged her shorts, Kane “felt something touch her butt 
crack which caused her to jump.”39  Further, while Kane 
repeatedly said her vagina was not injured, Barger’s incessant 
questioning about her vagina ultimately caused Kane to 
expose her vagina to him.    
 
Barger’s conduct after his encounter with Kane only 
underscores a conscience-shocking disregard for Kane’s right 
to bodily integrity.  Indeed, after photographing Kane, Barger 
failed to document the clothing evidence that Kane provided.  
That evidence remains unaccounted for.  Moreover, after 
Kane reported Barger’s conduct, Barger initially lied to 
outside investigators and said he never photographed Kane, 
let alone with his personal cell phone.  On this point, after 
Barger came clean with investigators, he said he lied because 
he did not want his girlfriend to be jealous of the fact that he 
photographed Kane. 
 
Altogether, the record—again, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Kane—supports the inference that Barger acted 
for his own personal gratification, rather than investigative 
ends, in both touching Kane and photographing her intimate 
bodily areas with his personal cell phone in violation of 
department policy.  That is conscience-shocking behavior.  
Thus, Barger violated Kane’s right to bodily integrity.40 
                                              
39 App. 173. 
40 To be clear, today’s holding is limited to the facts of this 
case and by no means suggests that photographing and/or 
touching a possible sexual assault victim during an 
investigation is a de facto violation of the right to bodily 
integrity.  Indeed, we can conceive of many legitimate 
 17 
B. 
 
 Having found Kane’s right to bodily integrity was 
violated, we now ask if that right was clearly established at 
the time of Barger’s conduct.41 
 
 “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently 
clear that every reasonable official would have understood 
that what he is doing violates that right.”42  “We do not 
require a case directly on point” to find that a right was 
clearly established.43  Rather, “[t]o be clearly established,” a 
right need only have “a sufficiently clear foundation in then-
existing precedent.”44  In this inquiry, “[w]e look first to 
applicable Supreme Court precedent.”45  However, “[e]ven if 
none exists, it may be possible that a robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals could 
                                                                                                     
investigative reasons for engaging in such conduct.  Here, 
however, by acting in a manner that could be interpreted as 
prioritizing his personal gratification over his investigative 
duties, Barger fell on the wrong side of the line. 
41 See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (noting that “we look at the state of the law” when 
the underlying conduct occurred “[t]o determine whether the 
right [was] clearly established”). 
42 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
43 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
44 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). 
45 L.R., 836 F.3d at 247–48. 
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clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified 
immunity.”46 
 
 “Defining the right at issue is critical to this inquiry,” 
and “[w]e must frame the right in light of the specific context 
of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”47  This does 
not mean that “an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful.”48  Accordingly, “it need not be the case 
that the exact conduct has previously been held unlawful so 
long as the contours of the right are sufficiently clear.”49  Said 
another way, we do not require a case “directly mirror[ing] 
the facts” at hand, so long as “there are sufficiently analogous 
cases that should have placed a reasonable official . . . on 
notice that his actions were unlawful.”50  As such, “officials 
                                              
46 Id. at 248 (alteration, citation, and quotation marks 
omitted). 
47 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
48 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (explaining that 
“[a]lthough earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ 
facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion 
that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to 
such a finding”). 
49 Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 451–52 
(admonishing against defining a right in a narrow and fact-
bound way for purposes of qualified immunity).  
50 L.R., 836 F.3d at 249. 
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can still be on notice that their conduct violates established 
law even in novel factual circumstances.”51 
 
 Here, the right at issue is an individual’s right not to be 
sexually fondled and illicitly photographed by a police officer 
investigating his or her case, for the officer’s own 
gratification.  Thus, based on the above, “[t]he ultimate 
question is whether the state of the law when the offense 
occurred” gave Barger “fair warning” that his conduct 
violated this right.52  We conclude that it did. 
 
 Intuitively, it seems absurd to analyze whether the 
right to be free from an officer’s sexual assault was clearly 
established by case law at the time of Barger’s conduct.  This 
is because, given the egregiousness of Barger’s violation of 
Kane’s personal security and bodily integrity, the right here is 
so “obvious” that it could be deemed clearly established even 
without materially similar cases.53  Indeed, while Barger has 
not been convicted of a crime, his actions—viewed in the 
light most favorable to Kane—resemble the crime of indecent 
                                              
51 Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.  
52 L.R., 836 F.3d at 247 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
53 Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 
548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (noting, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, that “general statements of the law are 
not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to 
officers” in “an obvious case” (citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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assault in Pennsylvania, where Barger’s conduct occurred.54  
Under Pennsylvania law, “indecent contact” is defined as 
“[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the 
person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, 
in any person.”55  By touching Kane’s intimate areas for his 
own personal gratification, that is effectively what Barger did 
here.56   
 
 Further, at the time of Barger’s conduct, both our case 
law and that of other circuits placed Barger on notice that he 
acted unconstitutionally.  In this regard, our decision in Doe 
v. Luzerne Cty.57 is illustrative.  In Doe, we held that male 
police officers violated a female colleague’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to privacy by videotaping her partially 
unclothed body without her consent in a showering area.58  
While Doe did not involve the specific right to bodily 
integrity, Doe and the present matter both involved male 
police officers who deceptively used recording devices to 
capture images of the intimate bodily areas of vulnerable 
                                              
54 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(1) (providing that “[a] 
person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent 
contact with the complainant . . . for the purpose of arousing 
sexual desire in the person . . . without the complainant’s 
consent”). 
55 Id. § 3101. 
56 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (explaining 
that qualified immunity does not protect “those who 
knowingly violate the law”).    
57 660 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2011). 
58 Id. at 175–78. 
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females.  Without doubt, Barger’s “specific conduct” is 
“sufficiently factually similar” to our decision in Doe to have 
placed him on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional.59  
Thus, in light of these factual similarities, Doe announced a 
“sufficiently clear” right to personal bodily security that 
“applie[d] with obvious clarity” at the time Barger acted.60  
  
 Analogous cases from other circuits underscore that 
the right here was clearly established.  For example, in 
Haberthur v. City of Raymore, the Eighth Circuit reversed the 
dismissal of a plaintiff’s substantive due process claim based 
on an officer’s sexual misconduct.61  There, the plaintiff 
alleged that the officer reached under her shirt, fondled her 
chest, and caressed her body while making sexually 
suggestive remarks.62  In finding that the plaintiff stated a 
claim, the Court characterized the officer’s conduct as 
“intrusive, demeaning, and violative of [the plaintiff’s] 
personal integrity.”63  
                                              
59 Kedra, 876 F.3d at 449 n.19 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
60 Id. at 450 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 211 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“If the unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct would 
have been apparent to a reasonable official based on the 
current state of the law, it is not necessary that there be 
binding precedent from this circuit so advising.”). 
61 119 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 1997). 
62 Id. at 721, 724. 
63 Id. at 724. 
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 Similarly, in Fontana v. Haskin, the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed a highway patrol officer’s conduct toward a plaintiff 
who was handcuffed and detained in the back of a patrol 
car.64  On the way to the police station, the defendant officer 
sat next to the plaintiff in the back seat while his partner 
drove.65  At that time, the officer inappropriately put his arm 
around the plaintiff and massaged her shoulders.66  The 
officer also made sexually suggestive statements concerning 
the plaintiff’s appearance and relationship status.67  While the 
case was decided on Fourth Amendment grounds because the 
plaintiff was handcuffed during the encounter, the Court 
held—in the alternative—that the officer’s sexual predation 
“was egregious and outrageous and shocks the conscience as 
a matter of law” under the Fourteenth Amendment.68 
 
 With this context, it is clear that—at the time Barger 
acted—the law provided fair warning that his sexual 
misconduct toward Kane was unlawful.  As such, the right 
was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity.  
  
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
64 262 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 882 n.7. 
